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140122 ||| eng |
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|a 9783790827064
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Schnedler, Wendelin
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| 245 |
0 |
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|a The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence
|c by Wendelin Schnedler
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| 250 |
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|a 1st ed. 2004
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| 260 |
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|a Heidelberg
|b Physica
|c 2004, 2004
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| 300 |
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|a VIII, 162 p
|b online resource
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| 505 |
0 |
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|a Effort Misallocation and the Value of Signals -- 2.1 Problems of Non-contractibility -- 2.2 Decomposing Agency Costs -- 2.3 Relationship between Misallocation and Uncertainty -- 2.4 Summary -- Firm Performance Measures -- 3.1 Multiple Agents and Free-Riding -- 3.2 The Use of Benefit Signals -- 3.3 Implications and Implementation -- 3.4 Summary -- Statistical Model and Empirical Evidence -- 4.1 Empirical Studies of the Value of Signals -- 4.2 The ECMOSS Data Set -- 4.3 Estimation Under Multivariate Censoring -- 4.4 Results -- 4.5 Summary -- Conclusion -- A Properties of the Multivariate Censoring Estimator -- B Stata Programme -- B Stata Programme -- C Tables -- References -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- List of Symbols
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| 653 |
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|a Human Resource Management
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| 653 |
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|a Game Theory
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| 653 |
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|a Game theory
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| 653 |
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|a Quantitative Economics
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| 653 |
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|a Personnel management
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| 653 |
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|a Econometrics
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b SBA
|a Springer Book Archives -2004
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a Contributions to Economics
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| 028 |
5 |
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|a 10.1007/978-3-7908-2706-4
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2706-4?nosfx=y
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330.9
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| 520 |
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|a What happens if A wants to buy a good or service from B, but not all relevant characteristics can be fixed in a contract? This book gives a non-technical overview of various models dealing with this situation. Particular emphasis is put on the problem that the service includes various tasks and B is paid by a performance measure (signal). As a result, B might choose the wrong allocation of effort between tasks. Of course, the wrong allocation entails costs. A method to calculate these costs is suggested and it is explored how and when these costs occur. Some performance measures seem to be less prone to misallocation such as measures of firm performance. Consequently, one expects more use of firm performance measures when misallocation can be a problem. This hypothesis is examined empirically
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