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140122 ||| eng |
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|a 9783322816252
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| 100 |
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|a Bungert, Michael
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|a Termination of Price Wars
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b A Signaling Approach
|c by Michael Bungert
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| 250 |
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|a 1st ed. 2003
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| 260 |
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|a Wiesbaden
|b Deutscher Universitätsverlag
|c 2003, 2003
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| 300 |
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|a XXIV, 240 p. 1 illus
|b online resource
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|a 4.1. Relevant Aspects for Price Wars and their Termination from Game Theory and Economics -- 4.2 Basic Concepts of Signals and Signaling -- 4.3 Approaches to Conflict Resolution from other Social Sciences -- 5. A Signaling Approach to Price War Termination, and Hypotheses on Price War Termination Moves and Termination-Relevant Signals -- 5.1 Signaling as an Approach to Terminate Price Wars -- 5.2 Hypotheses on Moves and Interpretations concerning their Potential to Induce Co-operation -- 5.3 Hypotheses on the Impact of Other Types of Interpretations -- 6. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis for the Price War Termination Experiment -- 6.1 Basics on Experimental Design and Interaction Analysis -- 6.2 Experimental Method and Data Collection -- 6.3 Basics on Regression and Logistic Regression Data Analysis Procedures -- 6.4 Logistic Regression Models of the Hypothesized Relations -- 6.5 Frameworkof Hypothesized Relations --
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|a 7. Results of the Signaling Experiment on Price War Termination -- 7.1 Some Descriptive Statistics on Subject Responses -- 7.2 Experimental Results of the Mediation Role of Signals on the Effects of Moves on Competitor Reaction -- 7.3 Experimental Results on the Moderation Effects of Impressions -- 7.4 The Matching of Marketing Moves as Enhancer of the Chance for a Co-operative Price Increase -- 7.5 The Reactions of Non-cooperative Subjects: A Closer Look -- 7.6 Discussion of the Concept and the Results of the Signaling Experiment on Price War Termination -- 8. Research and Managerial Implications -- 8.1 Research Implications -- 8.2 Managerial Implications -- List of Appendices
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|a 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Background of the Research Problem -- 1.2 Scientific Contribution, Focus and Particularities of the Analysis -- 1.3 Course of the Analysis -- 2. Basic Aspects of Price Wars -- 2.1 Definition Approaches of the Term ‘Price War’ -- 2.2 General Factors Leading to Price Wars -- 2.3 The Termination of Price Wars, and Rationales for their Termination -- 2.4 Price War Dynamics: Empiric Findings and a Phase Scheme Suggestion -- 2.5 Other Types of Aggressive Competitive Pricing and Delimitation than Price Wars -- 2.6 Classification Approach and Conclusions on Definitions of Price Wars -- 3. Overview of the Literature on Price Wars -- 3.1 Typology of Price War Related Literature -- 3.2 Literature on Price Wars in Economics -- 3.3 Price Wars in the Marketing and Business Literature -- 3.4 Conclusions on Literature on Price War -- 4. General Approaches to Conflict Analysis and Termination --
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| 653 |
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|a Marketing
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b SBA
|a Springer Book Archives -2004
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| 028 |
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|a 10.1007/978-3-322-81625-2
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| 856 |
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|u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-81625-2?nosfx=y
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 658.8
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|a Price competition frequently degenerates into its most devastating form: a price war. As the general consensus is that price wars substantially damage the firms involved a new approach is necessary to put an end to these conflicts. Michael Bungert investigates the possibility to terminate (non-beneficial) price wars through appropriate signals. In an experiment, he analyzes the effect of different types of signals such as switch-blocking intent, reciprocity, co-operation, weakness, and hostility on the price reaction behaviour of a competitor. The author shows the consequences of marketing moves such as individual refunding guarantees, coupons, image advertising, price-matching guarantees, verbal statements and unilateral price increase for the generation of the mentioned signals. He demonstrates that all signal types show a considerable effect on the probability of a co-operative price reaction
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