Hierarchically Structured Economies Models with Bilateral Exchange Institutions

In six chapters this book introduces a micro-economic model where trade takes place through a stable structure of bilateral exchange institutions.The main problem in such models is that, for well-known equilibrium concepts, equilibrium may fail to exist in the corresponding game. In this work an ada...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Spanjers, Willy
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York, NY Springer US 1997, 1997
Edition:1st ed. 1997
Series:Theory and Decision Library C, Game Theory, Social Choice, Decision Theory, and Optimization
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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245 0 0 |a Hierarchically Structured Economies  |h Elektronische Ressource  |b Models with Bilateral Exchange Institutions  |c by Willy Spanjers 
250 |a 1st ed. 1997 
260 |a New York, NY  |b Springer US  |c 1997, 1997 
300 |a VIII, 182 p  |b online resource 
505 0 |a 1 Introduction -- 2 Hierarchically Structured Exchange Economies -- 3 Mono Pricing in Hierarchical Trees -- 4 Bid and Ask Prices in Hierarchical Trees -- 5 Arbitrage -- 6 Hierarchies -- A Mathematical Appendix -- A.1 Terminology on Graphs -- A.2 Optimization -- B Equilibrium Concepts -- B.1 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium -- B.2 Equilibrium in Very Nice Plays -- B.3 Approximate Equilibrium in Very Nice Plays -- References -- Index of Authors -- Index of Subjects 
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653 |a Quantitative Economics 
653 |a Econometrics 
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490 0 |a Theory and Decision Library C, Game Theory, Social Choice, Decision Theory, and Optimization 
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520 |a In six chapters this book introduces a micro-economic model where trade takes place through a stable structure of bilateral exchange institutions.The main problem in such models is that, for well-known equilibrium concepts, equilibrium may fail to exist in the corresponding game. In this work an adaptation of such models - hierarchically structured economies - is introduced. The possibilities and limitations of the use of the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium within the context of this kind of models is discussed. Furthermore, it is shown that some well-known market forms, viz. Walrasian and monopolistic markets, occur as special cases. A modification of the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium is introduced to formulate and prove a general theorem on the existence of equilibrium in hierarchically structured economies