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140122  eng 
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a 9781475743852

100 
1 

a Manin, Yu.I.

245 
0 
0 
a A Course in Mathematical Logic
h Elektronische Ressource
c by Yu.I. Manin

250 


a 1st ed. 1977

260 


a New York, NY
b Springer New York
c 1977, 1977

300 


a XIII, 288 p
b online resource

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0 

a I Provability  I Introduction to formal languages  II Truth and deducibility  III The continuum problem and forcing  IV The continuum problem and constructible sets  II Computability  V Recursive functions and Church’s thesis  VI Diophantine sets and algorithmic undecidability  III Provability and Computability  VII Gödel’s incompleteness theorem  VIII Recursive groups

653 


a Mathematical logic

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a Mathematical Logic and Foundations

710 
2 

a SpringerLink (Online service)

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0 
7 
a eng
2 ISO 6392

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b SBA
a Springer Book Archives 2004

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0 

a Graduate Texts in Mathematics

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u https://doi.org/10.1007/9781475743852?nosfx=y
x Verlag
3 Volltext

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0 

a 511.3

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a 1. This book is above all addressed to mathematicians. It is intended to be a textbook of mathematical logic on a sophisticated level, presenting the reader with several of the most significant discoveries of the last ten or fifteen years. These include: the independence of the continuum hypothe sis, the Diophantine nature of enumerable sets, the impossibility of finding an algorithmic solution for one or two old problems. All the necessary preliminary material, including predicate logic and the fundamentals of recursive function theory, is presented systematically and with complete proofs. We only assume that the reader is familiar with "naive" set theoretic arguments. In this book mathematical logic is presented both as a part of mathe matics and as the result of its selfperception. Thus, the substance of the book consists of difficult proofs of subtle theorems, and the spirit of the book consists of attempts to explain what these theorems say about the mathematical way of thought. Foundational problems are for the most part passed over in silence. Most likely, logic is capable of justifying mathematics to no greater extent than biology is capable of justifying life. 2. The first two chapters are devoted to predicate logic. The presenta tion here is fairly standard, except that semantics occupies a very domi nant position, truth is introduced before deducibility, and models of speech in formal languages precede the systematic study of syntax
