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140122 ||| eng |
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|a 9781461502753
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| 100 |
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|a Aizawa, Kenneth L.
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| 245 |
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|a The Systematicity Arguments
|h Elektronische Ressource
|c by Kenneth L. Aizawa
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| 250 |
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|a 1st ed. 2003
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| 260 |
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|a New York, NY
|b Springer US
|c 2003, 2003
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| 300 |
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|a XV, 255 p
|b online resource
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|a 1. The Structure of Cognitive Representations -- 1.1 Some Theories of Cognitive Architecture -- 1.2 An Outline for the Book -- 2. Some History and Philosophy of Science -- 2.1 Copernican and Ptolemaic Astronomy -- 2.2 Darwinian Evolution and Creationism -- 2.3 What these Arguments have in Common -- 2.4 Some Broader Implications of our Explanatory Standards -- 2.5 Taking Stock -- 3. The Productivity of Thought -- 3.1 The Productivity Argument -- 4. The Systematicity of Inference -- 4.1 What is the Systematicity of Inference? -- 4.2 The Case Against the Systematicity of Inference -- 4.3 Explaining the Systematicity of Inference -- 4.4 Taking Stock -- 5. The Systematicity of Cognitive Representations -- 5.1 What is the Systematicity of Cognitive Representations? -- 5.2 Pure Atomistic Accounts of the Systematicity of Cognitive Representations -- 5.3 Classical Accounts of the Systematicity of Cognitive Representations -- 5.4 Taking Stock -- 6. The Compositionality of Representations -- 6.1 What is the Semantic Relatedness of Thought? -- 6.2 Accounts of the Semantic Relatedness of Thought -- 6.3 A Second Argument -- 6.4 Other Co-occurrence Explananda? -- 6.5 What is Fodor and Pylyshyn’s “Real” Argument? -- 6.6 The Tracking Argument and the Arguments from Psychological Processes -- 6.7 Taking Stock -- 7. The Systematicity Arguments Applied to Connectionism -- 7.1 Chalmers’s Active-Passive Transformation Model -- 7.2 Hadley and Hayward’s Model of Strong Semantic Systematicity -- 7.3 Taking Stock -- 8. Functional Combinatorialism -- 8.1 Gödel numerals -- 8.2 Smolensky’s Tensor Product Theory -- 8.3 Taking Stock -- 9 An Alternative Cognitive Architecture -- 10. Taking the Brain Seriously -- 10.1 The Fundamental Neuropsychological Inference -- 10.2 More History of Science -- 10.3 The Inductive Risks ofNeuropsychology -- 10.4 Parallel Distributed Processing -- 10.5 The Risk of Taking the Brain Seriously -- 11. Putting Matters in Perspective -- References
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| 653 |
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|a Philosophy, Modern
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| 653 |
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|a Early Modern Philosophy
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| 653 |
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|a Artificial Intelligence
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| 653 |
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|a Cognitive Psychology
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| 653 |
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|a Cognitive psychology
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| 653 |
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|a Philosophy of mind
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| 653 |
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|a Artificial intelligence
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| 653 |
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|a Philosophy of Mind
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| 041 |
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b SBA
|a Springer Book Archives -2004
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| 490 |
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|a Studies in Brain and Mind
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| 028 |
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|a 10.1007/978-1-4615-0275-3
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| 856 |
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|u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0275-3?nosfx=y
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 128.2
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| 520 |
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|a This book addresses a part of a problem. The problem is to determine the architecture of cognition, that is, the basic structures and mechanisms underlying cognitive processing. This is a multidimensional problem insofar as there appear to be many distinct types of mechanisms that interact in diverse ways during cognitive processing. Thus, we have memory, attention, learning, sensation, perception, and who knows what else, interacting to produce behavior. As a case in point, consider a bit of linguistic behavior. To tell a friend that I think Greg won a stunning victory, I must evidently rely on various bits of information stored in my memory, including who my friends are, who Greg is, what he won, and what natural languages I share with my friend. I must sense and perceive that my friend is within hearing distance, how loud I need to speak, how loud I am speaking, and whether my friend is paying attention. I must avail myself of what I know about the language I share with my friend, along with innumerable principles about human "folk psychology. " This book does not address the full range of contemporary theorizing about cognitive architecture, but only a part. It addresses theories of cognitive architecture that hypothesize that there exist cognitive representations, then begins to explore the possible structure of these representations. One of the leading hypotheses concerning the structure of cognitive representations is that it is akin to that found in symbolic logic
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