Ownership structure and the temptation to loot : evidence from privatized firms in the Czech Republic

Evidence from the Czech Republic shows that financial incentives and regulation are as important as ownership in the design of privatization

Main Author: Cull, Robert J.
Corporate Author: World Bank Development Research Group
Other Authors: Matesova, Jana, Shirley, Mary M.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and competition policy 2001, [2001]
Series:Policy research working paper
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: World Bank E-Library Archive - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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700 1 |a Shirley, Mary M. 
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520 |a Evidence from the Czech Republic shows that financial incentives and regulation are as important as ownership in the design of privatization